[Dailydave] You say it here, it comes out there...

[Justin Ferguson]

> Along these lines, you might find Marcia Hofmann's analysis
> of why only passwords preserve your 5th Amendment rights:
>
>
www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/the-unexpected-result-of-fingerprint-authentication-that-you-cant-take-the-fifth
>
> --dan

This is actually sort of a neat point and I'd be curious to see what
happens if someone refused to be fingerprinted due to it being their
authentication credentials on their phone. I bet you can't stop the
fingerprint but could get an injunction against using it to decrypt your
phone/whatever...which at least in the test tube would make it perfect
encryption in that LEO couldn't attempt to crack the crypto.

In other news; I just learner about this recently myself but there is such
a thing as cancellable biometrics (1) which sidesteps the "you cant change
your fingerprint if its compromised" argument, at least in theory anyways.
Implementation is always a different matter.

I wonder how crazy it is to think of biometrics, when dealt with in a
cancellable manner, as a password complexity reduction mechanism rather
than a replacement-- meaning you need the biometric data and a pin or
similar. Also lop wait apple managed to reduce fingerprints to a 1 in 50000
odds of collision?

(1) http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Cancelable_biometrics
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