[Dailydave] Longer form questions

[Chris Rohlf]

I think netflows have a lot of value in production and corp environments.
But if the question is ‘can NIDS, now or in the future, detect client side
remotes against scriptable targets’ then the answer is a resounding no.
NIDS in server environments simply can’t scale up enough or model the
complex tech stacks they sit in front of.

Sure you can write a signature to match a single exploit instance but its
easily bypassed, and requires reducing the security of TLS everywhere to
that of an unmanaged, and likely unpatched, linux box that stores your
private keys at the same privilege level of the program that parses complex
file and protocol structures from untrusted sources.

We haven’t even gotten into how badly this weakens good service mesh
architectures with mutual TLS. Any good security leadership wants metrics
but its risk calculations like this that almost always go unnoticed.

Chris

On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 7:15 PM Anton Chuvakin <anton at chuvakin.org> wrote:

> Wow, indeed, so 2007, this brings back memories ....
>
> But on a more serious note: do you guys truly think that network security
> monitoring (whether NIDS, network forensics / capture, "NTA / NDR", Bro /
> Zeek and such) is "dead dead"? And there no hope for any
> zombie-apocalypse-style revival? :-)
>
> On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 2:41 PM Chris Rohlf <chris.rohlf at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I’ve been happily ignoring Twitter the last few weeks so when I saw a DD
>> post come in I got excited and felt nostalgic for 2007, which
>> coincidentally this thread reminds me of. Not just because Dave is trolling
>> Rob but also because I thought the idea of network based protocol and file
>> parsers died around that time. How many HTTP implementation quirks does the
>> Snort engine implement these days? Back then it was almost none. But what
>> about now? Trick question, it doesn’t matter.
>>
>> Theres not enough memory or cpu in your average NIDS (or whatever they’re
>> called now) to possibly keep state while monitoring the traffic volume in
>> any real production deployment.
>>
>> I suppose theres only one RDP implementation whose quirks are worth
>> reimplementing, but what are the chances they did it better than Microsoft?
>> Does the MITM have as many mitigations as a modern Msft server OS? And are
>> you willing to trust it with all those private keys? Does the MITM box have
>> 2fa auth? Role based acl’s? What other disk did that key touch after your
>> team exported it? If you’re a CISO who is losing sleep over these exploits
>> but are not asking the questions above then you may not have your
>> priorities straight.
>>
>> Chris
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 11:03 AM Dave Aitel <dave.aitel at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/09/the-latest-on-bluekeep-and-dejablue.html
>>>
>>> Ok, so as someone pointed out in private email, they have a blog that
>>> goes through a 20 step process to exporting your private key from your RDP
>>> server to the MITM box that is parsing the protocol. I think this is an
>>> unlikely configuration, but in theory it IS possible. An anomaly detection
>>> algorithm might be a better option for real world detection, even though it
>>> is not specific to the bug.
>>>
>>> In other words, just to annoy Rob Graham, maybe network defenses can't
>>> really find every bug they want to - not just because they should not be
>>> edge-devices with vast repositories of every private key on your network,
>>> but because parsing requires state and state requires memory and you don't
>>> have infinite memory.
>>>
>>> https://vimeo.com/357848836 <---also watch the INFILTRATE teaser! :)
>>>
>>> ALSO: I'm headed to Tel Aviv next week if there's any infosec stuff
>>> happening there and anyone wants to say hi!
>>>
>>> -dave
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 12:57 PM Dave Aitel <dave.aitel at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> So I like the BLUEKEEP marketing train because it's a very hard bug to
>>>> detect authoritatively for either endpoint protection or for network-based
>>>> defenses. So when companies make claims about it, it's worth asking how
>>>> they did that. Twitter is a terrible place for that, but since I know
>>>> everyone in the industry who does this kind of thing is on this list I
>>>> figured I'd ask here...
>>>>
>>>> -dave
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://twitter.com/daveaitel/status/1169265348669005825
>>>>
>>>> [image: image.png]
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>
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>
>
> --
> Dr. Anton Chuvakin
> Site: http://www.chuvakin.org
> Twitter: @anton_chuvakin
> Work: http://www.linkedin.com/in/chuvakin
> Blog: https://blogs.gartner.com/anton-chuvakin/
>
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