[Dailydave] Friends, Romans...

[Dave Aitel]

So I just got back from Ekoparty, in Argentina. Ekoparty has great
technical content - much of which I listened to through a translator
service they had (which was surprisingly effective). Of course,
sometimes the interesting talks are not technical at all (and, luckily
for me, in English), as is the case with Grugq's OPSEC for Hackers
<http://www.slideshare.net/grugq/opsec-for-hackers> talk.

There are a lot of things I don't agree with in his talk, of course. I
have this talk coming up in Ottowa
<http://www.countermeasure2012.com/>in October in which I talk about
this a little bit, in particular the part where Grugq postulates that
hackers are not the apex predator on the Internet (which I assume is
classic misdirection on his part?)[1].

My only request for the next Ekoparty is that they should have coffee
ALL DAY LONG. The never-ending coffee pot is one of those amazing
inventions first seen at INFILTRATE <http://www.infiltratecon.com> but
which I hope will spread. :>

-dave

[1] I also don't agree that you should work alone, and my opinion is
that you should log everything. But the "break down what lulzsec did
wrong" is a very useful task to take (and one I think he should expand
on at length in a post here, perhaps). Perhaps comparing it to the Flame
team
<http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/750/Full_Analysis_of_Flame_s_Command_Control_servers>
would be useful? In the end, a study of cyber-OPSEC will eventually lead
to people creating a useful Doctrine to govern this sort of thing, which
(imho) would demonstrate the underlying strategy that covers this RSA
talk <http://seclists.org/dailydave/2012/q2/39>.

-- 
INFILTRATE - the world's best offensive information security conference.
April 2013 in Miami Beach
www.infiltratecon.com

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