<p dir="ltr">I like the watermark idea, though I doubt I would have gotten Tang to agree since she basically did not want to talk about specific types of operations. It would have required acknowledging Chinese operators were mapping the battlefield, something she is not in a place to do. </p>
<p dir="ltr">And yes, you're right to point out the differences of views of undesirable behavior. We might agree on taking down (or replacing with cupcake recipe ) IED instructions but not on uighhur activists </p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On May 19, 2016 7:27 AM, "dave aitel" <<a href="mailto:dave@immunityinc.com">dave@immunityinc.com</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">One thing that COULD make sense is the Chinese telling us when they hack<br>
power plants and find someone else they don't recognize on critical<br>
systems.<br>
<br>
(But you might need a watermarking system for that to actually work. :)<br>
ANNOYING LINK REPOST:<br>
<a href="http://cybersecpolitics.blogspot.com/2016/03/a-technical-scheme-for-watermarking.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://cybersecpolitics.blogspot.com/2016/03/a-technical-scheme-for-watermarking.html</a><br>
<br>
But to bring it back to your point: If Wikileaks were getting the<br>
majority of its funding from China, would you expect the Chinese to<br>
block that? We all have very different understandings of what<br>
constitutes a cyber capability, or undesirable activity on the Internet.<br>
<br>
-dave<br>
(Also, as a side note: posts to the list don't show up in the queue if<br>
you are not subscribed from that address)<br>
<br>
On 5/18/2016 3:48 PM, Adam M. Segal wrote:<br>
> There was, as you can imagine, a certain amount of politics involved in co-writing this with a Chinese author, and things were often not fleshed out because they quickly ran into political realities. I can't speak for Tang, but I was not thinking export controls. I was thinking more disrupting the infrastructure of the groups to find, use, develop these capabilities through other means-shared intel leading to kinetic, financial or other ops. All not likely given strategic mistrust between the two sides<br>
><br>
> -----Original Message-----<br>
> From: dave aitel [mailto:<a href="mailto:dave@immunityinc.com">dave@immunityinc.com</a>]<br>
> Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2016 3:35 PM<br>
> To: Adam M. Segal <<a href="mailto:asegal@cfr.org">asegal@cfr.org</a>>; <a href="mailto:dailydave@lists.immunityinc.com">dailydave@lists.immunityinc.com</a><br>
> Subject: Where the nuclear metaphors all breakdown.<br>
><br>
> <a href="http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf</a><br>
><br>
> Reading down into the cyber section...<br>
> """<br>
> Beijing and Washington share an interest in preventing extremist groups and other third parties from attacking critical infrastructure and should discuss joint measures to stop the proliferation of capabilities to nonstate actors.<br>
> """<br>
><br>
> That's the kind of sentence that only makes sense if you're thinking about export control actually working as if "Cyber Capabilities" were something more than "code" and "information". But what else could you be thinking about here? What does this actually MEAN?<br>
><br>
> -dave<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
<br>
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</blockquote></div>